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Dubuque Packing.' Employer Relocation Decisions
and the Need for a Principled Approach to
Determining What Is Subject to Mandatory
Collective Bargaining
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent National Labor Relations Board's (the Board's) decision in
Dubuque Packing Co., 2 "present[s] hard questions-indeed, some of the most
polarizing questions in contemporary labor law." 3 The decision exemplifies the
uncertainty and confusion that encompasses relocation decisions in labor-
management relations law. The result of Dubuque Packing is that the Board has
now relied on four different approaches to determine whether or not
management's" decision to relocate is subject to mandatory collective
bargaining. 4 The administrative and judicial indecision in determining whether
relocation decisions should be subject to mandatory collective bargaining is the
result of continuing difficulties in interpreting the purposes of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 5 as well as applying Supreme Court precedent
governing what types of decisions are subject to mandatory collective
bargaining. Defining an approach to interpreting the NLRA is essential.
Although the Board in Dubuqe Packing fashioned a majority-supported
approach for determining if management decisions to relocate should be subject
to mandatory collective bargaining, the Board's approach is fundamentally
inconsistent with the purposes of the NLRA as well as existing Surpeme Court
precedent.
Rather than providing insight and guidance for determining what is subject
to mandatory collective bargaining, Dubuque Packing only further confounds
the difficulties surrounding the issue. Instead of relying on the balancing test
provided in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 6 the Board attempted
1 Dubuque Packing Co. (Dubuque 1), 287 N.L.R.B. 499 (1987), remanded sub. nomL
United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Local 150-A v. NLRB, 880 F.2d 1422
(D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd, Dubuque Packing Co. (Dubuque RI), 303 N.L.R.B. no. 66, 1991
WL 146795 (1991).
2 Dubuque HI, 303 N.L.R.B. no. 66, 1991 WL 146795 (1991).
3 Id. at *1 (quoting United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Local 150-A v.
NLRB, 880 F.2d 1422, 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
4 See infra notes 124-36, 201-15 and accompanying text.
5 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as
amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-69 (1988)).
6 See infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
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to forge a new approach for addressing employer relocation decisions. 7
Although many commentators have criticized the Supreme Court's decision in
First National Maintenance as prompting an excursion by the judicial branch
away from the stated purpose of the NLRA, 8 this Comment will. demonstrate
that such criticism is misplaced. The balancing test set forth in First National
Maintenance is not only consistent with the intentions and purposes of the
NLRA, but is essential for determining what management decisions are subject
to collective bargaining, including employer relocation decisions. 9 The
balancing test involves examining the benefits and the burdens of collective
bargaining in light of the surrounding circumstances of a particular situation.
Part HI of this *Comment explores the legislative history and language of the
NLRA and the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). Part M1 examines
the tenets of existing Supreme Court precedent addressing how to determine
what employer decisions are subject to mandatory collective bargaining. Part
IV examines decisions rendered by the Board and the courts before and after
First National Maintenance in the area of employer relocation. Part V explores
Dubuque Packing in depth. And finally, Part VI analyzes Dubuque Packing
and develops a "comprehensive" balancing test based on the test set forth in
First National Maintenance. The suggested approach will then be applied to
Dubuque Packing to indicate how a decision should have been reached.
II. LEGISLATiVE BACKGROUND
During the turbulent times surrounding the labor sector of the market in
the 1930's, Congress enacted the Wagner Act of 1935 (the NLRA) to combat
the existing strife between labor and management. 10 Congress intended the
NLRA to promote the free flow of commerce and industrial peace by
equalizing the bargaining power between labor and management. 11 The main
purpose of the NLRA was to abolish the inequality between labor and
management by providing employees with the right to form or join unions,
7 See infra part V.B.
8 See infra note 88.
9 See infra part III.B.
10 NLRA, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988)).
For previous commentator discussions of the legislative history of the "Act" see James
Friedman, Keeping Big Issues Off the Table: 7he Supreme Court on Entreprenuerial
Discretion and the Duty to Bargain, 37 ME. L. REV. 223, 226-29 (1985); B. Glen George,
To Bargain or Not to Bargain: A New Chapter in Work Relocation Decisions, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 667, 670-74 (1985); Thomas T. Crouch, Note, The Viability of Distinguisting
Between Mandatory and Pennissive Subjects of Bargaining in a Cooperative Setting: In
Search ofIndustrial Peace, 41 VAND. L. REV. 577 (1988).
11 See generally LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT,
1935, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) [hereinafter NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
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engage in collective bargaining with management and use their economic
weapons in a peaceful manner to gain concessions from management. 12 To
insure that the employer bargained with the union, the NLRA made an
employer's refusal to bargain with the union an unfair labor practice. 13
Furthermore, the NLRA authorized the National Labor Relations Board to
prohibit management's interference with the union's right to bargain. Congress,
however, limited the Board's role to insuring that the parties followed the
procedural aspects of the NLRA. The Board was not to interfere with the
substantive terms of the contracts. 14 Hence, the union, as representative of the
employees, and management were to bargain over the substantive terms
governing labor contracts while the Board made sure that the employer fulfilled
its duty to bargain collectively and in good faith. 15
While the employer had a duty to bargain with the union, nothing in the
NLRA indicated the scope or extent of the employer's obligation to bargain
with the union. 16 In 1947, in order to circumscribe the vagueness surrounding
the employer's duty to bargain in good faith, and to keep the Board from
interfering with the substantive content of labor contracts, Congress sought to
12 The essential rights of the employees are set forth in Section 7: "Employees shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor orgainizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."
NLRA § 7, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988)), reprinted in
2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 3273.
13 NLRA § 8(5), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1988)), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 3274.
14 NLRA § 8(d), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1988)), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 2373. There is no
language in the statute indicating that the Board may determine if the agreement between
the parties is fair.
15 The NLRA does not provide for public regulation of the terms of the contracts. In
fact, section 8(d) specifically prohibits the Board from requiring the parties to reach an
agreement. According to Senator Walsh:
When employees have chosen their organization, when they have selected their
representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort them to the door of their employer
and say, "Here they are, the legal representatives of your employees." What happens
behind those doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it.
79 Cong. Rec. 7660 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11,
at 2373.
16 See supra note 13.
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better define the scope of the employer's duty to bargain17 by amending the
NLRA with the Taft-Hartley Act (LMRA).18
The legislative history of the LMRA indicates that the House initially
sought to require bargaining over five categories of management decisions. 19
By the final draft of the Amendment, however, Congress defined collective
bargaining as the "mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of
the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment... but such
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession... ."20 By keeping a high degree of flexibility in the
language, Congress' modification of the NLRA maintained consistency with
the original intent that labor and management would resolve their differences
themselves through the collective bargaining procedures. 21 The importance of
17 There was a great deal of concern in the House that the Board had overused its
power by requiring employers to make specific concessions rather than merely enforcing
the employers' duty to bargain. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20
(1947), reprinted in 1 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS Aur, 1947, at 297-98 [hereinafter LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. To permit
the Board such latitude in addressing an employer's failure to bargain in "good faith" would
be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act as set forth by Senator Walsh. See supra note
15; see also Friedman, supra note 10, at 227-28; NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union,
361 U.S. 477 (1960).
18 The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(1947), reprinted in 1 LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 1-30 (codified as
amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 151-69 (1988)).
19 The House version of the bill required bargaining concerning:
(i) wage rates, hours of employment, and work requirements; (ii) procedures and
practices relating to discharge, suspension, lay-off, recall, seniority, and discipline, or
to promotion, demotion, transfer and assignment within the bargaining unit; (iii)
conditions, procedures, and practices governing safety, sanitation, and protection of
health at the place of employment; (iv) vacations and leaves of absence; and (v)
administrative and procedural provisions relating to the foregoing subjects.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. section 2(11) (1947), reprinted in 1 LMRA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 17, at 166-67.
20 LMRA § 8(d), 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1988)), reprinted in 1 LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 8.
21 The legislative history of the amendment demonstrates the importance Congress
attached to keeping the bargaining process conducive to the promotion of free negotiation of
contracts between the employer and the employees:
What are proper subject matters for collective bargaining should be left in the first
instance to employers and trade-unions, and in the second place, to any administrative
agency skilled in the field and competent to devote the necessary time to a study of
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allowing the parties to freely bargain over the terms of their agreement is
exemplified in the House minority report, which stated: "The appropriate scope
of collective bargaining cannot be determined by a formula; it will inevitably
depend upon the traditions of an industry, the social and political climate at any
given time, the needs of employers and employees, and many related
factors." 22 True to its legislative intent, the NLRA provides no insight
whatsoever into what decisions should be subject to collective bargaining and
what decisions, if any, should not.
From this morass evolved an important distinction between "decision"
bargaining and "effects" (impact) bargaining. 23 Decision bargaining involves
the employer bargaining with the union concerning the prudence and wisdom
of the employer's decision, as well as possible alternatives. 24 An employer has
a duty to bargain over its decision if the decision involves "wages, hours, or
other terms and conditions of employment."25 Effects bargaining deals with the
effects of an employer's decision on the well-being of the employees while the
employer's decision is treated as final. 26 There is generally a broad per se duty
requiring the employer to notify the union of its decision and bargain with the
industrial practices and traditions in each industry or area of the country, subject to
review by the courts. It cannot and should not be strait-jacketed by legislative
enactment.
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1947) (minority report), reprinted in 1
LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 362.
22 1 LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 362.
23 See Brown Truck and Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953). In this case, the
Board first made the distinction between "decision" and "effects" bargaining. The employer
failed to bargain with the union concerning the employer's decision to close down a plant
and transfer the work. The Board held that the employer did not have a duty to bargain
over the decision to close down and move, but did have a duty to "advise the union of the
contemplated move and to give the union the opportunity to bargain with respect to the
contemplated move as it affected the employees .... " Id. at 1000.
24 See PHILLIP A. MISCIMARRA, THE NLRB AND MANAGERIAL DISCRETION:
PLANT CLOSINGS, RELOCATIONS, SUBCONTRACTING, AND AUTOMATION, at 16-19
(1985); see also Thomas C. Kohler, Distinctions Without Differences: Effects Bargaining in
Light of First National Maintenance, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J 402, 413-18 (1983); Peter C.
Schwarz, Note, Section 8(d) of the NLRA and the Dity to Decision-Bargain Over Work
Relocation: Some Observations on Management Rights After Milwaukee Spring I, 36
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1055, 1058 n.29-31 (1985); W.R. Gradl, Comment, Job Security,
Managerial Prerogatives, and First National Maintainance, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 509, 509
n.3 (1982).
25 MISCIMARRA, supra note 24, at 16-19; see also Kohler, supra note 24, at 413-18;
infra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
26 See MISCIMARRA, supra note 24, at 16-19; see also Kohler, supra note 24, at 413-
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union concerning the effects of the change on the employees even though an
employer is not required to bargain with the union concerning its decision.27
The openness of the language in the NLRA28 led to vast amounts of Board
and court activity in attempting to define which decisions are subject to the
collective bargaining provisions of the Act and which are not. This intervention
ultimately led to a delineation of "mandatory" and "permissive" subjects of
collective bargaining. 29 In NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.,30
the Supreme Court read NLRA sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) together to limit the
duty of the employer to bargain in good faith to those subjects considered
mandatory. As to "other matters," the parties were free to "bargain or not to
bargain,- agree or not to agree." 31 Hence, while the parties must bargain in
good faith over "mandatory" subjects until an impasse is reached, once an
impasse is reached, neither side is required to make concessions and the
employer is free to act unilaterally. Neither party, however, is required to
bargain over "permissive" subjects, and an agreement may not be conditioned
upon the acceptance of permissive terms. 32 Another consequence of Borg-
Warner was to permit the employer to unilaterally modify an item in an
agreement without the consent of the union if the item was permissive. An
employer, however, may not implement a unilateral change in an agreement if
the term of the agreement is subject to mandatory collective bargaining.33
Although the Court took the liberty of drawing the distinction between
mandatory and permissive subjects of collective bargaining, nowhere in the
opinion did the Court offer any type of methodology for determining what
particular topics would be subject to mandatory collective bargaining and what
27 Brown Truck, 106 N.L.R.B. at 1000; Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 998,
1006 (1957) (The employer has a general obligation to bargain which includes the duty to
notify the union of the bmployees and afford the union the opportunity to bargain with
respect to a "contemplated change concerning the tenure of the employees and their
conditions of employment.").
28 Hereinafter the NLRA and the LMRA are collectively referred to as "the Act."
29 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1957). In Borg-
Warner, the employer sought to include in the Agreement with the union a "recognition
clause" and a "ballot clause." The recognition clause sought to exclude the International
Union as a representative of the employees and recognize only the local affiliate. The ballot
clause called for a pre-strike secret vote by union and non-union workers as to the
employer's last offer. Borg-Warner eventually made acceptance of the entire Agreement a
condition precedent upon the union accepting the two clauses. The Court summarily held
that neither clause was subject to mandatory collective bargaining, and thus the company
could not demand that the union bargain over the subjects. Id.
30 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1957).
3 1 Id. at 349.
32 Id. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
33 Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. at 349; Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
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topics would be permissive.34 While this may have been done for any number
of reasons, 35 it appears that the Court was simply articulating what seemed
obvious from the language of the statute-those topics that involve "wages,
hours, or terms and conditions of employment" are mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining, while those topics that fall outside of the statutory
definition are permissive.36 Although Congress intended employers and unions
to have a vast amount of flexibility in negotiating their contracts, 37 the LMRA
was also intended to provide a more definite framework for determining the
subject-matter falling under the realm of collective bargaining.38 Thus, Borg-
Warner was simply a judicial restatement of what Congressional action had
already expressed.
Unfortunately, the result of the distinction drawn by the Court in Borg-
Warner has led to one of the most controversial issues in labor law-what
exactly is subject to mandatory collective bargaining? 39 The difficulty rests in
the persistent attempts by the Board and the courts to develop a formula
designed to determine what, exactly, is and is not a "term or condition of
employment. "40 Although the Board and the courts have managed to determine
that a host of topics are subject to mandatory collective bargaining under
NLRA section 8(d), 41 a great deal of difficulty surrounds issues of economic
34 The Court's lack of guidance in the decision has prompted a great deal of criticism
from various commentators. See generally Archibald Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme
Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L. REV. 1057 (1958); Friedman, supra note 10;
William B. Gould IV, The Burger Court and Labor Law: The Beat Goes On-Marcato, 24
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 51 (1987); Note, Major Operational Decisions and Free Collective
Bargaining: Eliminating the MandatorylPemissive Distinction, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1971
(1989).
35 Note, supra note 34, at 1977 n.30 (suggesting three reasons why the Court did not
articulate a rationale for its decision: (i) Board's abuse of the good faith analysis; (ii)
reducing the number of bargaining subjects would reduce the number of impasse bargaining
situations; or (iii) without limits on the number of bargaining subjects, the stronger party
would be too dominant).
36 Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. at 348-49.
37 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
38 See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text. But see Note, supra note 34
(criticizing Congress for even amending the NLRA with the Taft-Hartley Act).
39 See LEE MODJESKA, NLRB PRACTICE, § 4.6, at 288 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
40 Dubuque If, 303 N.L.R.B. no. 66, 1991 WL 146795, at *6-10 (1991).
41 Topics subject to mandatory collective bargaining include, inter alia: Aeronca,
Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 261, enforce. denied, 650 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1981) (longstanding
practice of giving Christmas gifts); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979)
(price of food in cafeterias); J.P. Stevens & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 738 (1978), enforced, 623
F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981) (employee safety); Peerless
Food Prods., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 161 (1978) (grievance and arbitration procedures); W'mn-
Dixie Stores v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 1343, 1347 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985 (1978)
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and entreprenurial control such as employer relocations, plant closures and
partial closures. Before examining the different tests and approaches proposed
and used by the Board and the courts, this Comment examines the additional
guidance offered by the Supreme Court in determining which employer
decisions are subject to mandatory collective bargaining.
III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
In addition to Borg-Warner, there are two Supreme Court cases of great
significance addressing the subject of mandatory collective bargaining:
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB42 and First National Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB. 43 Together, these two cases represent the cornerstone for
determining which employer decisions require bargaining.
(profit sharing plans); Awrey Bakeries, Inc. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 138, 139 (6th Cir. 1976)
(layoffs and recalls); Dolly Madison Ind., Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1970) (most favored
nation status); American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 552, 554-55 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969) (company housing); NLRB v. Houston Chapter, Assoc.
Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc., 349 F.2d 449, 451 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1026 (1966) (company hiring practices); The Little Rock Downtowner, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B.
1286 (1964), enforced, 341 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1965) (workloads); Industrial Union of
Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of America v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615, 620 (3d Cir. 1963)
(operations of employer's seniority program); Richfield Oil Co. v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 717,
724 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (stock purchase arrangements); W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174
F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1949) (group insurance programs); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170
F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949) (pension plans); NLRB v.
I. H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766, 768-69 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948)
(merit wage increases); Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131, 136-37 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941) (bonuses). Compare permissive topics which include, inter
alia: Covington Furniture Mfg. Corp., 212 N.L.R.B. 214, enforced, 514 F.2d 995 (6th
Cir. 1975) (indemnity clause); NLRB v. Bricklayers & Mason Int'l Union, 405 F.2d 469,
471 (9th Cir. 1968) (fees and dues guaranty clause); Phillip Carey Mfg. Co., Miami
Cabinet Div. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720, 725-26 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964)
(superseniority for nonstrikers and strike replacements); Douds v. Int'l Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 241 F.2d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1957) (scope of the bargaining unit); and NLRB v. Retail
Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 203 F.2d 165, 170 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 839 (1954)
(inclusion of supervisors in the bargaining unit). See MODJESKA, supra note 39, at 299-
305; see also Timothy J. Heinsz, The Partial Closing Conundrum. The Duty of Employers
and Unions to Bargain in Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 71, 72-73 (1981); Edward P.
O'Keefe & Seamus M. Tuohey, Economically Motivated Relocations of Work and an
Employer's Duty Under Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act: A 7hree-Step
Analysis, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J 795, 801-03 (1983).
42 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
43 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
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A. Fibreboard Paper
In Fibreboard, the Court addressed the issue of whether an employer's
decision to "contract out" its plant maintenance operations due to high labor
costs required bargaining with the union. 44 After conducting a study, the
company concluded that it could save money if it engaged an independent
contractor to perform the necessary maintenance at the plant. 45 The company
then informed the union of the results of the study and of its decision to
subcontract the maintenance services. The company further informed the union
that negotiations in light of their study would be pointless. 46 After failed
attempts by the union to discuss the situation with management, subcontractors
replaced the unit workers. 47
The union then proceeded to file unfair labor practice charges against the
company pursuant to sections 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the Act. The trial examiner
recommended that the complaint be dismissed and the Board agreed. 48 After a
change in Board membership, however, the Board granted the requests for
reconsideration of the complaint. 49 Upon reconsideration, the Board held that
even though the company had based its decision to contract out the maintenance
work on economic factors rather than anti-union animus, the failure of the
company to bargain with the union was a breach of its duty to bargain in good
faith. 50 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia enforced the Board's
decision5 ' and the Supreme Court affirmed. 52
The Court set forth two reasons why the employer breached its duty to
bargain over its decision to contract out and why the decision to contract out
should be subject to mandatory collective bargaining. First, the Court stated
that its holding was consistent with the language and the purposes of the Act.
According to the Court, the contracting out of labor was "well within the literal
meaning of the phrase 'terms and conditions of employment.'" 53 However, it
has been noted that the Court's premise is merely a statement without support
in the legislative history of the Act.54
44 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 379 U.S. at 205-06.
45 Id. at 206.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 207.
48 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558, 1558 (1961).
49 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550, 550 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d
411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), afid, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).5 0 Id. at 551 (relying on Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962)).
51 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
52 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203 (1964).
53 Id. at 210.
54 See Friedman, supra note 10, at 248-49 (criticizing the decision as unrealistic based
on the Act).
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Second, the Court looked at existing industrial practices regarding
bargaining over decisions to subcontract. The Court determined that provisions
regarding contracting out work existed in "numerous" agreements and were the
subject of numerous grievances as well.55 Based on these two observations, the
Court found that the employer's failure to bargain with the union concerning its
decision to subcontract was an unfair labor practice in violation of the Act.
The Court further indicated that the primary purpose of the Act was to
"promote the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes by subjecting labor-
management controversies to the mediatory influence of negotiation."56 The
Court concluded that the issue of contracting out was of such "vital concern"
that it was appropriately placed within the bargaining framework so that labor
and management could resolve the issue in pursuit of industrial peace. 57
The Court went on to examine how the employer's decision in this case did
not alter the company's basic operations, but rather turned entirely upon labor
costs.58 The Court contrasted the decision to subcontract work based on labor
costs with a decision to subcontract based on capital investment plans. The
Court suggested that had the decision to contract out centered upon capital
investments or improvements, the company may not have had a duty to bargain
with the union.59 The Court's comparison of the labor costs against the extent
of capital investment provided the springboard for the balancing test the Court
later used in First National Maintenance. 60
The Court in Fibreboard also specifically limited its holding. When the
employer replaces employees in the existing bargaining unit with an
independent contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of
employment, the employer must bargain with the union. The decision did not
address all situations of contracting out and/or subcontracting. 61 While the
Court has sometimes been criticized for failing to set forth some sort of limiting
criteria for determination of what is subject to mandatory collective
bargaining, 62 it is apparent that the Court did follow the legislative history of
the Act by not prescribing a set formula for determining what is and is not
55 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 379 U.S. at 211-12.
56 Id. at 211 n.4 (relying on the declaration of policy set forth in sections 1 and 101 of
the LMRA (29 U. S. C. §§ 141 & 151 (1988))).
57 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 379 U.S. at 211.
58 ld. at 213.
59 Id.
60 First National Maintainance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
61 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 379 U.S. at 215.
62 See generally Friedman, supra note 10; George, supra note 10; Heinsz, supra note
41; Crouch, supra note 10, at 577; Note, Eliminating the Mandatory/Permissive Distinction,
supra note 34; John B. McArthur, Note, Enforcing the NLRA: 7he Need for a Duty to
Bargain Over Partial Plant Closings, 60 TEX. L. REv. 279 (1982).
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subject to collective bargaining.63 Rather, by limiting its decision to the case
before it, the Court left the door to negotiations open so that labor and
management could explore and discuss the variety of issues certain to arise in
the future.
Probably the most significant aspect of the case was Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion, in which he set forth three categories of management
decisions. 64 Justice Stewart expressed the fear that the language of the Court's
opinion was much too broad and would be applied beyond the facts of the
case. 65 To demonstrate the appropriate limitations of Fibreboard, Stewart
delineated three categories of management decisions. First, there are
management decisions [Type I] that clearly fall within the language "terms and
conditions of employment." 66 Such decisions include what one's hours are to
be, the amount of work expected, safety procedures, questions of employee
discharge, and work assignment.67 The second category of decisions [Type II]
involve decisions that "lie at the core of entreprenurial control" and cannot be
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining despite their effect on job
security. 68 Decisions falling into this category include advertising expenditures,
product design, manner of financing, and sales strategy. While these types of
decisions have an impact on an employee's job security and employment,
management need not bargain over such decisions because the impact is too
attenuated and indirect. 69 The third catageory of management decisions [Type
m] involves decisions that are "not in themselves primarily about conditions of
employment, though the effect of the decision may be necessarily to terminate
employment." 70 According to Stewart, nothing in the Court's holding should
be read to imply a mandatory duty to bargain over Type H decisions. 71
Stewart's categorization and discussion of the need to limit the expansiveness of
the "terms and conditions" language, and the entire Fibreboard opinion, would
prove to be the nucleus of the First National Maintenance decision.
63 See supra note 36.
64 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 379 U.S. at 223-25 (Stewart J., concurring).
65 Id. at 218, 221.
6 6 Id. at 224.
6 7 Id. at 222.
68 Id. at 223.
69 Id.
70 Id. These three categories were later articulated in First National Maintenance and
the Supreme Court created a balancing test to resolve determinations under category three.
First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677 (1981).
71 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 225 (1964).
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B. First National Maintenance
In First National Maintenance, the Court addressed the issue of whether an
employer had a duty to bargain with the union over its decision to partially
terminate a portion of its operations for economic reasons. 72 First National
Maintenance provided cleaning and maintenance services to Greenpark Care
Center, a nursing home.73 Greenpark provided the equipment, supplies and
materials, reimbursement of labor fees and a set management fee in exchange
for the maintenance services. 74 Overall, the relationship between First National
Maintenance and Greenpark was not very "remunerative or smooth." 75 In
March of 1987, Greenpark provided First National Maintenance with a 30-day
notice of cancellation of their contract due to inefficient services. 76 First
National Maintenance, however, continued to provide services to Greenpark
until July 6, when, upon realizing that it was losing money on the contract,
First National Maintenance informed Greenpark that without an adjustment in
the contract, First National Maintenance would cease operations. 77
While First National Maintenance was encountering its difficulties with
Greenpark, the First National Maintenance employees elected union
representation, and on July 12, the union notified First National Maintenance
that it wanted to bargain.78 However, on July 28, First National Maintenance
informed the employees that they would be discharged in three days.79 The
union attempted to negotiate with First National Maintenance, but the company
claimed the decision centered upon economics and was final. 80 The union filed
unfair labor practice charges against First National Maintenance pursuant to
sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. 81
The Administrative Law Judge (AJ) found in favor of the union, stating
that First National Maintenance failed to bargain over its decision to terminate
the employees as well as the effects of the termination.8 2 The ALD reasoned
that because the employees would lose their jobs, their termination resulted in a
change of "conditions" under the Act. Furthermore, the Ail stated that
bargaining over the decision to terminate employment would have provided the
72 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 667.
73 Id. at 668.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 669.
76 Id.
77 Id. Rather than the $500 fee agreed upon in the original contract, Greenpark
apparently only paid First National Maintenance $250. Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 669-70.
81 Id. at 670.
82 Id.
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union with the opportunity to offer alternatives to the unit's termination. 83
Thus, the ALl's conclusion was that all decisions to terminate employment
were subject to mandatory collective bargaining-per se. The Board adopted
the ALJ's holding without analysis, and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit enforced the Board's order, using a somewhat different
analysis. 84
The Second Circuit stated that section 8(d) of the Act created a "rebuttable
presumption" in favor of mandatory bargaining over decisions to terminate
employment. 85 The court suggested that the presumption could be rebutted in
one of three ways. First, the employer could seek to demonstrate that
bargaining over the decision would be futile. Second, the employer could argue
that the decision was the result of an emergency financial situation. Third, the
employer could seek to show that bargaining over the decision was not a
customary practice of the industry. 86 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari87 and, in a heavily criticized opinion, 88 reversed the Second Circuit
83 Id. at 670-71.
84 Id. at 671-72.
85 NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596, 601-02 (2d Cir. 1980),
rev'd, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).86 First Nat'Y Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d at 601-02.
87 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). The courts and the
Board applied several different tests in determining near identical issues as the ones before
the Court. While some of the Courts of Appeals accepted the rebuttable presumption test set
forth by the Second Circuit, others applied the "per se" approach adopted by the Board in
this case. Still other courts followed the test set forth in Fibreboard not requiring bargaining
if the decision involved a major capital investment, or a change in the basic operations of
the business. The Board was apparently all over the place in terms of applying different
tests. Id. at 672-73 nn.7-10.
88 Stanley A. Gacek, The En~ployer's Duty to Bargain on Termination of Unit Work,
32 LAB. L.J. 699, 710-16 (1981); George, supra note 10, at 678-80; Michael C. Harper,
Leveling the Road From Borg Warner to First National Maintenance: The Scope of
Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1449-62 (1982); Kohler, supra note 24;
Mary Aronov, Comment, Labor Law-The Employer's Duty to Bargain Over a Decision to
Close Part of its Business, 12 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 185 (1981); Gradl, supra note 24;
Shelley Hoffman, Note, Employer's Duty To Bargain With Respect to Partial Termination of
Business: First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 36 Sw. L.i. 793, 801-05 (1982);
McArthur, supra note 62; Andrew Seiden, Comment, Labor Law: An Employer's Duty to
Bargain Concerning the Decision to Tenninate Part of a Business, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 292
(1982); Susan M. Solomon, Note, Collective Bargaining Over Plant Relocation Decisions:
Let's Make A Deal, 18 NEw ENG. L. REV. 715, 732-39 (1983); Note, The Supreme Court,
1980 Term, Labor-Scope of Mandatory Bargaining Under the NLRA, 95 HARV. L. REV.
91, 329, 329-38 (1981); Wtlliam R. Whitehurst, Note, Labor Law-A Balancing of
Interests Test Applied to the Duty to Bargain About a Partial Closing Decision: First
National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 61 N.C.L. REV. 365 (1983).
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and the Board by holding that the employer had no duty under section 8(d) to
bargain over its decision to terminate the contract.8 9
The Court first examined the purposes and the language of the Act. Again,
the Court drew from the language that only "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment" were subject to mandatory collective
bargaining. 90 The Court then adopted Justice Stewart's three types of
management decisions in Fibreboard as the initial step in determining whether
the decision fell under section 8(d).91 A problem arises only when a decision is
a Type I decision.
The Court reasoned that decisions produced through the collective
bargaining process only result in the anticipated industrial peace and improved
labor-management relations if the "subject proposed for discussion is amenable
to resolution through the bargaining process." 92 However, determining what
subjects were not "amenable to resolution through the collective bargaining
process" involved a .complex consideration of both the employer's and the
employees' interests. 93 In order to balance these respective interests, the Court
set forth a balancing test that mandated bargaining over Type III decisions if
the benefit to labor-management relations and the collective bargaining process
outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of business.94
The Court stated that the employer's need for "unencumbered
decisionmaking" necessitated the balancing test.95 In applying the balancing
test, the Court examined labor's interests, citing job security and the need for
fair dealing on behalf of the employer as vital. 96 The Court also noted that
labor's needs were adequately protected by the Act and effects bargaining. 97
The Court further stated that if labor costs were an important factor, the
employer would clearly have an incentive to bargain with the union. 98 On the
employer's side of the scales, the Court recognized management's need for
speed, flexibility, secrecy, and profitability as burdens that may not, in light of
the circumstances, require bargaining over Type II decisions. 99 Thus, once an
adjudicatory body determines that the employer's decision is a Type III
decision, it must apply the balancing test to the facts of the situation to
determine whether the decision is amenable to the bargaining process. If the
89 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 686.
90 Id. at 674-75. See also supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
91 Id. at 676-77 (quoting Stewart, .).
92 Id. at 678.
93 Id. at 678-79.
94 Id. at 679.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 681-82.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 682.
99 Id. at 679, 682-83.
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decision is amenable to the bargaining process, then bargaining will be
mandated. The Court noted that it implicitly applied the balancing test in
Fibreboard.1 0
With the balancing test in place, the Court next determined whether partial
closing decisions were subject to mandatory collective bargaining. The Court
concluded that the harm likely to be done to the company by mandating
bargaining concerning a decision based wholly on economic factors (i.e., loss
of a customer) outweighed any possible benefit attainable through the
bargaining process.10 1
In expressing the limits of its holding, the Court stated that it in no way
intimated a view as to other types of management decisions. 102 Furthermore,
the Court limited the case to its facts, stressing that in this case the decision to
terminate part of its operations turned on economic factors involving the size of
a management fee, over which the union had absolutely no control. 03 Also,
the Court indicated that the employer had no intention of replacing the
discharged employees.' 0 4
With Fibreboard and First National Maintenance etched out, it is clear that
in determining what exactly are "terms and conditions of employment," the
Court anticipated and advocated that a balancing of the respective interests of
the parties would produce equitable results. The Board, however, has not
readily followed the Court's direction.
IV. RELOCATION DECISIONS
A. Decisions Before and Immediately After First National Maintenance
The decisions before and after First National Maintenance reflect the
inability of the Board and the courts to develop and utilize a systematic
100 Id. at 679.
101 Id. at 686.
102 Id. at 686 n.22. Footnote 22 states in part:
In this opinion we of course intimate no view as to other types of management
decisions, such as plant relocations, sales, other kinds of subcontracting, automation,
etc., which are to be considered on their particular facts. See, e.g., International
Ladies' Gannent Workers Union v. NLRB, 150 U.S. App. D.C. 71, 463 F.2d 907
(1972) (plant relocation predominantly due to labor costs); Weltronic Co. v. NLRB, 419
F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970) (decision to move plant
three miles) ....
Id. (emphasis added).
103 Id. at 687.
104 Id.
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approach to addressing relocation decisions. Prior to the advent of First
National Maintenance, the Board consistently applied a per se approach to
employer relocations, holding that all employer decisions to relocate workers,
equipment or operations were subject to mandatory collective bargaining.10 5
The Board went so far in American Needle & Novelty Co. 106 to declare that
"[i]t is well settled that an employer has an obligation to bargain concerning a
decision to relocate unit work." 10 7
The Board continued to apply its per se approach to employer relocations
even after First National Maintenance. The Board relied on the limiting
language of First National Maintenance as indicating the holding of the case
was inapplicable to employer relocation decisions. 108 In Tocco Division of
Park-Ohio Industries, Inc.,l09 the Board's first relocation decision after First
National Maintenance, the Board maintained its position that "[i]t is well
settled that an employer has an obligation to bargain concerning a decision to
relocate unit work." 110 The Board failed to even acknowledge First National
Maintenance and its possible application.11' When the Board did recognize the
105 See, e.g., Otis Elevator (Otis 1), 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981), rev'd, 269 N.L.R.B.
891 (1984); Whitehall Packing Co., 257 N.L.R.B. 193 (1981); Coated Products, Inc., 237
N.L.R.B. 159 (1978), enforced, 620 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1980); P.B. Mutrie Motor Transp.,
Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1325 (1976); Stone and Thomas, 221 N.L.R.B. 573 (1975); Burroughs
Corp., 214 N.L.R.B. 571 (1974); American Needle & Novelty Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 534
(1973); R.L. Sweet Lumber Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 529 (1973), enforced, 515 F.2d 785 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1975); Regal Aluminum, Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. 468 (1971);
McLoughlin Mfg. Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 958 (1970), enforced as modified sub non.
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Plymouth Indus., Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 607 (1969), enforced, 435 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1970);
Weltronic Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 235 (1968), enforced, 419 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970); Standard Handkerchief Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 15 (1965). For
detailed discussions of the development of the Board's approach to relocation decisions
prior to First National Maintenance, see George, supra note 10, at 681-86; O'Keefe &
Tuohey, supra note 41, at 815-19.
106 206 N.L.R.B. 534 (1973) (transferring work from one facility to another facility
within a multiplant operation).
107 Id. at 534 (citing Weltronic Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 235 (1968)).
108 Specifically, the Board relied on footnote 22, see supra note 102.
109 257 N.L.R.B. 413 (1981), enforced, 702 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1983) (An employer
relocated its operations from Cleveland, Ohio to Boaz, Alabama in order to reduce
production costs. However, it was unclear whether the lower costs would be the result of
lower wages, cheaper raw materials, lower energy costs or some other decreased cost.).
110 Id. at 413 (citing American Needle & Novelty Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 534 (1973)).
111 Whitehall Packing Co., 257 N.L.R.B. 193 (1981) (The Board, adopting the ALI's
opinion, held that the employer failed to bargain in good faith over its decision to relocate
work to an "alter ego" company. The case may be distinquishable, however, because of the
employer's apparent anti-union animus as opposed to a change in the nature of the
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potential application of First National Maintenance, the Board's
acknowledgement amounted to little more than distinguishing First National
Maintenance from the case before it.1
12
Perhaps the only area of consistency in employer relocations is when an
employer relocates because of anti-union animus. Where direct evidence exists
that the employer relocated to avoid bargaining with a union, such a relocation
is considered a "runaway shop" and will result in a prima facie unfair labor
practice." 3 The line of reasoning addressing "runaway" shops was upheld in
First National Maintenance. 1 14 This rule is of course consistent with the Act
and is a per se rule.I s
B. Otis Elevator I & I[
The Board reiterated its per se approach to employer relocations in Otis
Elevator Co. (Otis 1). 116 In Otis I, United Technologies (United) acquired the
Otis Elevator Company. United decided to consolidate research and
development facilities by transferring the Otis Elevator research and
development units located in Parsippany and Mahwah, New Jersey to a new
facility in East Hartford, Connecticut."17 United transferred the non-union
work unit in Parsippany to East Hartford, then proceeded to transfer seventeen
employer's business.); see also Ford Bros., Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 92 (1982) (similar to
Witdehall Packing).
112 See Carbonex Coal Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1982). The employer failed to
bargain over a decision to relocate the work unit. Again, however, anti-union animus was
present. The Board distinquished the case from First National Maintenance. Id. at 1307 n.2.
113 See, e.g., Strawsine Mfg. Co., 280 N.L.R.B. 553 (1986) (although suffering from
financial difficulties, the Board determined that the employer relocation was motivated by
anti-union animus and was therefore an unfair labor practice); Ethyl Corp., 231 N.L.R.B.
431 (1977) (closure of even part of an employer's operations because of anti-union animus
resulted in a runaway shop and therefore unfair labor practices); Garwin Corp., 153
N.L.R.B. 664 (1965), enforced in part sub nor. International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967)
(employer closed plant in New York and relocated to Florida in order to avoid the "union
clutches"); see also C.J.R. Transfer, Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. no. 148 (1990), 1990 WL 173741,
enforced, 936 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1991); Lear Siegler, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 857 (1989);
Arrow Automotive Indus. Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 487 (1987), enforcement denied, 853 F.2d
223 (4th Cir. 1988); Dahl Fish Co., 279 N.L.R.B. 1084 (1986), enforced, 813 F.2d 1254
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Safelite, Div. of Lear Siegler, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 782 (1985); Pay 'N
Save Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 311 (1974); Helrose Bindery, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 499 (1973).114 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 682 (1981).
115 See supra part II.
116 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981), rev'd, 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984). For a detailed
discussion of the Otis land 17 decisions, see George, supra note 10, at 686-95.117 Otis 1, 255 N.L.R.B. at 235-36.
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work unit employees from the unionized Mahwah facilities to East Hartford,
refusing to bargain with the union over its decision to relocate the
employees. 118 United cited a desire to have the elevator research and
development facilities closer to its research headquarters, duplication of tasks,
and outdated facilities at Mahwah as reasons for the relocation. 119 The union
argued that United had a duty to bargain over the decision to transfer the
employees to the new facilities. 120
The Board, upholding and essentially adopting the ALT's opinion, stated
that United's "reorganization" did not involve a relatively large capital
investment and did not appear to change the nature, scope, or direction of the
business. 121 Relying heavily on Fibreboard, the Board held that United
violated its duty to bargain with the union in good faith over its decision to
relocate the facilities and workers and therefore committed an unfair labor
practice.
While the case was before the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, the Supreme Court rendered First National Maintenance.122 Upon
the rendering of First National Maintenance, the Board requested that the
Court of Appeals remand the case for reconsideration in light of First National
Maintenance.123 The Board then reversed itself in Otis Elevator Co. (Otis
1). 124 Although the Board sought to have Otis I remanded for reconsideration
in light of First National Maintenance, only one of the three opinions produced
in Otis II purported to actually use the First National Maintenance balancing
test. The result of the Otis II opinions was simply to muddy murky waters.
The plurality opinion, penned by Members Dotson and Hunter, proposed
an analysis based essentially on the motivation of the employer's decision to
relocate. The plurality held that the "essence of the decision" was the
determining factor in concluding whether the decision at issue is subject to
mandatory collective bargaining. 125 If the essence of the decision to relocate
118 Id. at 236, 242 (United transferred 17 of the 350 employees from Mahwah
facilities and approximately 30 from the Parsippany facilities to East Hartford.).
119 Id. at 235-36.
120 Id. at 242-43.
121 Id. at 236. The Board noted that only a total of 43-53 persons were transferred and
of those, only 17 were represented by the union. Furthermore, while the cost of the
facilities was $2-3.5 million, this was a relatively insignificant capital investment in light of
United's $2 billion international operation. Therefore, the Board concluded that there was
no significant capital investment, nor was there a shift in the nature of the business practice
as the Court in Fibreboard indicated would permit the employer to freely excercise its
decisionmaking power without bargaining with the union. Id.
122 Also, while the appeal was pending, President Reagan appointed to the Board three
new members (Chairman Dotson and Members Dennis and Hunter).
123 Otis Elevator Co. (Otis 1]), 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 891 (1984).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 892.
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resulted in a change in the nature, scope, or direction of the business, then the
decision would not be subject to mandatory collective bargaining. If the
decision turned upon labor costs, however, then the decision would be subject
to mandatory collective bargaining. 126 The opinion went so far as to imply that
bargaining would only be mandatory if labor costs were the "sole"
consideration. 127 Thus, rather than actually applying the First National
Maintenance balancing test, the plurality merely acknowledged First National
Maintenance and then went on to use a comparison analysis to hold that United
did not have to bargain with the union concerning its relocation decision.
The plurality chose to "rely" on First National Maintenance despite its
limiting language and the fact that it explicitly stated it did not apply to
relocation decisions. 12 8 The Board reasoned that although the Court excluded
relocation decisions from its analysis, it was necessary to examine relocation
decisions in light of Justice Stewart's Fibreboard analysis. The Board
concluded that the underlying premise of Fibreboard and First National
Maintenance was that management should not be required to bargain over
decisions involving a change in the nature or scope of the business. 129
In a concurring opinion, Member Dennis purporting to use First National
Maintenance, applied a diluted version of the balancing test. Under Dennis'
approach, the first determination is whether the decision is amenable to the
collective bargaining process. 130 The key factor in determining whether a
decision is amenable to the collective bargaining process turns on the union's
ability to offer the employer "significant consideration" such as concessions
that would make a difference in the employer's decision. 13' If the decision is
deemed not amenable to the bargaining process, the analysis would end and the
decision would not be subject to mandatory bargaining.
If the employer's decision is amenable to the collective bargaining process,
however, then the second step of Dennis' approach would apply. The second
step requires application of the First National Maintenance balancing test. 132
Upon applying the balancing test, if the benefits to the collective bargaining
126 Id. at 891-92.
127 Id. at 894. A plurality of the Board, relying on the reasoning in First National
Maintenance, stated: "[]f labor costs were a factor, that element of the decision could be
adequately dealt with in effects bargaining." Id. (citing First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 682 (1981)).
128 Otis 17, 269 N.L.R.B. at 893.
129 Id. The Board stated that the needs of management expounded in First National
Maintenance (predictability, flexibility, speed, secrecy, and profitability) operated to
exclude from mandatory collective bargaining all decisions involving a change in the scope
or direction of a business. Id. at 893 (emphasis added).
130 Id. at 897 (Member Dennis, concurring).
131 Id.
132 Id.
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process and labor-management relations outweigh the burdens imposed upon
management and its conduct of business, then bargaining with the union over
the decision is mandatory. Otherwise, management is free to act without
bargaining with the union. 133 In the present case, Dennis claimed that the
decision itself was not amenable to the collective bargaining process, and
therefore did not apply the balancing test. 134
The third approach in Otis II was Member Zimmerman's "amenability to
the collective bargaining process" standard. 135 If, upon looking at the decision,
it appeared the decision was amenable to the collective bargaining process, then
the employer had to bargain with the union concerning the decision. If the
decision was not amenable, the employer was not required to bargain over the
decision. Zimmerman held that United's decision was not amenable to the
bargaining process and therefore United was not required to bargain with the
union. 136
The result of Otis II on relocation decisions was a hodge-podge of
inconsistent reasoning that failed to latch onto one of the opinions set forth in
Otis 1. 137 The opinions following Otis II relied sometimes on the plurality's
"turns on labor cost" approach; 138 but often the Board simply used an "under
133 Id. Member Dennis, relying on First National Maintenance, cited as factors to be
examined in determining the extent of the burden imposed upon management as: extent of
capital commitment, extent of changes in operations, need for speed, need for flexibility and
need for confidentiality. Dennis also suggested that the list was not exclusive. Id.
134 Id. at 899 (Member Dennis, concurring). According to Dennis, the focus of
United's decision to relocate was based on profitability of the company. Furthermore,
Dennis stated that the factors prompting United's decision were beyond the control of the
union and therefore bargaining would not be worthwhile. These factors included: antedated
technology, noncompetitive product designs, and duplication of efforts. Id.
135 Id. at 900-01 (Member Zimmerman, concurring in part).
136 Id. Member Zimmerman reached his conclusion by stating that United's decision
to relocate revolved around profitability and was entreprenurial in scope. Thus, the decision
fell outside the bargaining relationship. Id.
137 In light of the confusion certain to arise as a result of the three separate opinions of
Otis II, the General Counsel issued a memorandum attempting to clarify and simplify the
decisions of the Board. The Memorandum considered three factors: (1) whether the
employer's decision involves a change in the scope, direction, or nature of the business; (2)
whether the employer's decision is motivated by labor costs; and (3) whether the employer's
decision is amenable to the collective bargaining process and, if so, whether the benefits to
labor-management relations outweigh the burdens bargaining would impose upon
management. The General Counsel then formulated responses to these three factors which
were then used to create a matrix indicating whether the decision should be subject to
mandatory collective bargaining. Office of the General Counsel, Memorandum GC 84-12,
1984 WL 50031 at *1, 4 (1984) (N.L.R.B.G.C.).
138 See Local 2179, United Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 822 F.2d 559 (5th Cir.
1987) (upholding Board use of "turns upon labor costs" as consistent with First National
Maintenance); Desoto, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 788 (1986); Mack Trucks, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B.
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any of the Otis / opinions" approach, leaving parties and courts unsure as to
what factors the Board relied on in making its decision. 139 Thus, the post-Otis
H decisions resulted in a lack of clarity and guidance in addressing relocation
decisions.
C. Mid-Tenn Modifications
Cases addressing relocations while a collective bargaining agreement
governs the labor-management relationship, like the relocation decisions
discussed above, have a rich history of confusion. The confusion in the mid-
term relocation decisions centered primarily upon a continuing rift between the
Board and the courts. The Board believed that mid-term relocations were per se
an unfair labor practice. However, the courts, for the most part, concentrated
more on the terms of the existing agreement to determine whether such a
relocation decision violated the agreement between the parties and therefore
violated the Act. 140 The advent of Milwaukee Spring Division (Milwaukee
711 (1985); Bostrom Div., UOP Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 999 (1984); Fraser Shipyards, Inc.,
272 N.L.R.B. 496 (1984); Columbia City Freight Lines, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 12 (1984). But
see Arrow Automotive Indus., Inc., 853 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the Board's use
of the "turns upon labor costs" approach as inconsistent with First National Maintenance).
139 See The Reece Corp., 294 N.L.R.B. 448 (1989) (using the "under any view"
approach to hold that employer was required to bargain with union over decision to
relocate); FMC Corp., 290 N.L.R.B. 483 (1988) (relying on Milvaukee Spring 17 and any
of the views expressed in Otis 1R); Plymouth Stamping Div., Eltec Corp., 286 N.L.R.B. 890
(1987), enforced, 870 F.2d 1112 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989); Roytype
Div., Pertec Computer Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 810 (1987); Sands Motel and AMM, Inc., 280
N.L.R.B. 132 (1986); Dahl Fish Co., 279 N.L.R.B. 1084 (1986) (using both the "turns on
labor costs" and "under any view" to require the employer to bargain with the union over
its decision to relocate); Mack Trucks, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 711 n.3 (1985) (Member Babson
relying on the "under any view" approach).
140 The case history of midterm modifications is as follows: The first case normally
considered is University of Chicago, 210 N.L.R.B. 190 (1974). In this case, the University
executed an intrafacility transfer of unit workers at the same time the University informed
the union of its intent to do so during an existing agreement. The Board held such a transfer
violated the Act and therefore resulted in an unfair labor practice. On appeal, however, the
court denied enforcement of the Board's order because the agreement did not specifically
prohibit such transfers and the University had fulfilled its Fibreboard obligation because the
transfer was not motivated by anti-union animus and the University had bargained in good
faith with the union to impasse before instituting the transfer. University of Chicago v.
NLRB, 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975). The next significant midterm relocation decision
before the Board was Boeing Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 696 (1977). Here, the Board interpreted a
recognition clause as prohibiting intraplant transfers, and therefore held the company's
action involved a unilateral modification of the existing agreement violating the Act. Again,
on appeal, the court denied enforcement of the Board's order by interpreting the clause as
not prohibiting work transfers, and because the company complied with the two-prong
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Spring 11)141 appears to have settled the continuing difficulties plaguing this
particular area of labor-management relations.
In Milwaukee Spring II, the company originally operated three automotive
parts facilities. 142 In January 1982, the company sought mid-term concessions
by asking the union at the Milwaukee Spring Division to forgo scheduled wage
increases. 143 The union failed to respond to the employer's proposal and in
March 1982, because of the loss of a major customer, the company informed
the union that without wage and benefit reductions the company would have to
approach set forth in Chicago, the court found the company had met its obligation. Boeing
Co. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1978).
Facing another midterm relocation challenge in Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co., the
Board adopted the AU's conclusion that the employer violated the Act when it laid off
several workers and relocated its operations to different, facilities because of economic
difficulties. Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978). Although the
employer sought, concessions from the union, the union refused and so the employer
relocated without consulting the union. Id. This time, however, the court upheld the Board's
conclusion despite failing to indicate where in the agreement a provision existed prohibiting
such transfers. Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir.
1979). This was entirely inconsistent with the previous courts of appeals decisions and
specifically appeared to contradict the 9th Circuit's earlier decision in Boeing.
The Board upheld its reasoning in Milwaukee Spring Div., Illinois Coil Spring Co.
(Milwaukee Spring 1), 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982). However, the Board, as in Ois Elevator,
asked to have the case returned to the Board while the appeal was pending to reconsider its
decision in light of First National Maintenance.
For extensive discussions of the cases and reasoning involved in reaching midterm
relocation decisions by the Board and the courts, see generally Robert B. Mitchell, Note on
the NLRB's Milwaukee Spring II Decision, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1441 (1984); O'Keefe &
Tuohey, supra note 41; David W. Barton, Note, Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil
Spring Co.: The Open Road for Employer Relocations of Bargaining Unit Work During the
Term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 973 (1986); Claudia
Wickham Lane, Comment, Unfair Labor Practice and Contract Aspects of an Employer's
Desire to Close, Parially Close, or Relocate Bargaining Unit Work, 24 DUQ. L. REv. 285
(1985); JoAnne D. Roake, Comment, The Spring has Sprung: The Fate of Plant Relocation
as a Mandatory Subject of Bargaining, 24 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 221 (1985); Schwarz, supra
note 24; Bryan E. Lee, Recent Development, Labor Costs and Midterm Work Relocation:
Unfair Labor Practice or Breach of Contract?-International Union, United Automobile
Workers v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985), 61 WASH. L. REV. 1273 (1986).
141 Milwaukee Spring Div., Illinois Coil Spring Co. (Milwaukee Spring II), 268
N.L.R.B. 601 (1984).
142 Id. at 601 (The three facilities were McHenry Spring, Holly Spring and Milwaukee
Spring.).
143 Id. The work unit at Milwaukee Spring Division was unionized and workers
received $10 per hour as opposed to the McHenry Spring Division, which was non-union
with the workers receiving $5.85 per hour. Milvaukee Spring 1, 265 N.L.R.B. at 207.
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relocate operations to another facility.144 The union rejected this proposal. 145
Although the company continued to attempt to bargain with the union over its
proposed relocation, the union was not cooperative. On April 4, 1982, the
company carried out its relocation plan.146
Upon asking to reconsider the case in light of First National
Maintenance,147 the Board reversed its earlier decision rendered against the
company.148 The Board stated that a specific clause "contained in" the
agreement had to be modified in order for an unfair labor practice to result.
Upon examining the existing agreement, the Board failed to find such a
modification. 149 Furthermore, the Board indicated that it was "NLRB textbook
law" that an employer did not have to obtain the union's consent on a matter
not included in the agreement-even if the subject is a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining. 150
The Board went on to accept the appellate courts' analysis of the previous
cases and proclaimed that the test should be that unless transfers are specifically
prohibited by the agreement, an employer is free to transfer work out of the
bargaining unit if (1) the employer bargains in good faith to an impasse; and (2)
the employer is not motivated by anti-union animus.151 Conversely, if a subject
is "contained in" the agreement, then the employer must obtain the union's
consent before modifying the agreement. Because the company did not modify
a clause in the agreement when it implemented its relocation decision, the
Board found no violation of the Act.
144 Milwaukee Spring II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 601. The employer stated that the operations
would be relocated to the McHenry facility.
145 Id.
146 Id. The parties stipulated that the decision to relocate was not motivated by anti-
union animus, but that the decision was motivated by economic considerations-based
primarily on labor costs. Milwaukee Sping 1, 265 N.L.R.B. at 207.
147 See supra note 140.
14 8 Milwaukee Spring 17, 268 N.L.R.B. at 601.
149 Id. at 602. The Board first surmised that the Milwaukee Spring I Board must have
found a modification of the agreement's wage and benefits provision. However, the Board
rejected this contention and went on to find that the relocation did not modify the
recognition clause. Id.
150 Id. at 603 (relying on Ozark Trailers, 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966)).
151 Id. at 604 (quoting University of Chicago v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 942, 949 (7th Cir.
1975)). The Board also stated that a distinction had been drawn between midterm work
reassignments and midterm work relocations, and such a distinction was not necessary.
Thus, the 7th Circuit test is to be applied in the same manner to both types of decisions as
"transfers of work." According to the Board, as far as University of Ctdcago, Boeing and
Los Angeles Marine were inconsistent with the present decision, they were overruled. See
supra note 140.
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V. DUBUQUE PACKING152
A. Factual Background
The Dubuque Packing Company was a closely-held corporation operating
beef and hog slaughtering facilities throughout the country.153 At all times, a
collective bargaining agreement governed the relationship between Dubuque
Packing and the union.154 In 1977, the company began to suffer financial woes
and to post substantial losses. As these losses continued, the company found it
necessary to seek modifications of the existing collective bargaining agreement
in an effort to alleviate the operating losses. The first attempt by Dubuque
Packing to get the union to sacrifice contractual entitlements was via a
proposed "buy-back" plan in 1978.155 The buy-back plan involved a one-time
cash payment in exchange for an increase in the existing standard of employee
output necessary to receive incentive pay.156 The union accepted this
proposal. 157
The buy-back plan, however, failed to alleviate the mounting financial
pressures facing the company. In June 1980, the company provided the union
with a notice that the company was terminating its beef operations on
December 12, 1980.158 The company indicated that the main problem it faced
in attempting to alleviate its losses was the high premiums required by the
employees to get full production. 159 As an alternative to closing the beef
operations, the company sought another mid-term modification. Dubuque
152 See Dubuque I, 287 N.L.R.B. 499 (1987). The AL's opinion, which was
summarily adopted by the Board, provides an exhaustive factual description of the events
surrounding negotiations and the relationship between Dubuque Packing and the union. Id.
at 501-34.
153 United Food & Commercial Workers' Int'l Union, Local 150-A v. NLRB, 880
F.2d 1422, 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Dubuque 1, 287 N.L.R.B. at 500 (At the time of the
initial hearings concerning alleged unfair labor practices by Dubuque Packing, the company
operated 13 facilities.).
154 United Food & Commercial Workers' lnt'l Union, Local 150-A, 880 F.2d at 1423.
The Agreement was in effect from September 1979 to September 1982.
155 Id. at 1424.
156 Dubuque 1, 287 N.L.R.B. at 501-02. These modifications were made to the then
existing 1976-1979 agreement and resulted in an increase of the output requirement by
15%. In a memo to the union, the company acknowledged that the existing incentive
program had cost the company $4.7 million.
157 Id. at 502.
158 United Food & Commercial Workers' Int'l Union, Local 150-A, 880 F.2d at 1424.
The company indicated that in 1979 it had lost $8 million. According to the company, the
beef operations were not carrying the company as in the past. The company provided the
union with a six-month notice of intent to close as required by the existing agreement. Id.
159 Id.
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Packing asked the workers to forego all incentive pay while maintaining the
existing output level. In return for the union's approval of this mid-term
concession, the company promised not to seek any additional modifications for
the remainder of the existing agreement. 160 The union accepted the
proposal. 161 As a result of the modification, the company managed to keep the
beef operations going on a month-to-month basis beyond the closing
deadline. 162
As the company was seeking the aforementioned modifications from the
union, it was also encountering a great deal of difficulty with its banks. In light
of the company's financial difficulties, the banks became increasingly hesistant
about continuing to extend credit. In December 1980, the company's
consortium of banks announced they were unwilling to provide additional
credit necessary for $5 million of needed improvements to the Dubuque plant.
Furthermore, in January 1981, Dubuque Packing's primary lender called an
outstanding $10 million loan due to default. 163 Thus, despite attempts to ease
its troubles, the company's financial difficulties continued.
In response to the banking problems, Dubuque Packing approached the
workers again, this time seeking an increase in the chain speed of the hog kill
operations. 164 The union refused to grant the concessions, and on March 30,
1981, Dubuque Packing provided the union with notice that it was closing the
hog kill and cut operations on September 30, 1980 for economic reasons. 165
Subsequent to the notice, the company sent announcements to all employees at
the Dubuque facility, which included a statement informing the workers that
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1425. In fact, the beef operations at the Dubuque facility remained intact
until its final closure and sale in September 1982. Dubuque I, 287 N.L.R.B. 499, 504 n.21
(1987).
163 Id. For a detailed description of Dubuque Packing's relationships with banks, see
Dubuque 1, 287 N.L.R.B. at 532-34. Mercantile Bank of St. Louis notified Dubuque
Packing that the remaining loan would be due March 31, 1981. In addition, a revolving line
of credit granted by the bank would also be cut off. Dubuque Packing immediately sold off
two plants, one in Wichita, Kansas, and the other in south San Francisco, California. The
company also made several other cost-cutting measures in an effort to avoid the recall of the
debt; however, all proved ineffective and the debt was recalled. Id. at 533.
164 United Food & Conmercial Workers' Int'l Union, Local 150-A, 880 F.2d at 1425.
The chain speed simply means the number of hogs slaughtered per hour. Dubuque II, 303
N.L.R.B. no. 66, 1991 WL 146795, at *3 (1991). Also, recall that Dubuque sought the
concession despite its previous promise not to seek any additional concessions for the
remainder of the 1979-1982 agreement. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
165 Dubuque I, 287 N.L.R.B. at 509 (providing the six-month notice of an intended
closure as required by the existing agreement). The termination of the hog kill and cut
operations was to result in the loss of approximately 500 jobs. Id. at 507.
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pork slaughterers paying $16.00 per hour were going out of business while
those paying $8.00 per hour were able to expand their businesses. 166
Additionally, in May 1981, a local newspaper recovered a "confidential"
memorandum from the garbage, which it published, indicating that if the
workers of the Dubuque facility agreed to concessions, there was a chance to
save the hog kill and cut operations.167 The published memo was the first
indication that union concessions could save the hog operations.168 In June
1981, the company informed the union that if it agreed to a plant-wide wage
freeze, the company would revoke its plans to eliminate the hog kill and cut
operations. 169 The company went so far as to "guarantee" that the hog kill and
cut operations would remain for the balance of the agreement if the union
would provide the necessary concessions. 170 In exchange for the concessions,
the company offered a profit-sharing plan, which would provide the unit
workers with a percentage of any profits resulting from the wage freeze. 17 1 The
union rejected the proposal. 172
166 Id. at 508. The union, of course, countered the above information with statements
indicating that the problems of the industry were much more far-reaching. Id. at 509.
167 United Food & Commercial Workers' lnt'l Union, Local 150-A, 880 F.2d at 1425-
26. The manner in which this memorandum came into the local newspaper's possession was
not revealed. However, the authenticity of the confidential memorandum was never
disputed. Dubuque 11, 303 N.L.R.B. no. 66, 1991 WL 146795, at *12 n.24. The
memorandum indicated that if labor costs remained at the present level, the company might
be able to keep its plant open. Furthermore, the memorandum indicated that the company
had lost about $6.2 million in 1980, much of which was attributable to labor costs. Dubuque
1, 287 N.L.R.B. at 508.16 8 Dubuque 1, 287 N.L.R.B. at 508.
169 Id. at 509.
170 United Food & Commerdal Workers' Int'l Union, Local 150-A, 880 F.2d at 1426.
The company made its position known through a statement made in response to a Chamber
of Commerce offer to mediate the situation between the company and the union. The union
rejected the Chamber of Commerce's offer. Dubuque 1, 287 N.L.R.B. at 509.
171 Dubuque 1, 287 N.L.R.B. at 510. According to the ALJ, the plan could be
summarized as follows:
[lf management's... proposal was agreed to, the employees' pay rate would be
frozen at $10.02 an hour through [September 1, 19821, but they then would receive
profit sharing in the event of profits. The... closing of the hog cut and kill and the
beef kill would be rescinded for at least the term of the then-current collective-
bargaining agreement, and the continuation of those operations would be guaranteed for
the next 15 months.
Id.
172 United Food & Commercial Workers' Int'l Union, Local 150-A, 880 F.2d at 1426.
The wage freeze would result in the wages being frozen at $10.02 per hour. This involved a
sacrifice by the union of four cost-of-living increases throughout the course of the
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The company then released a press statement indicating that it would
proceed with its plans to terminate the hog kill and cut operations.
Furthermore, for the first time, the company revealed its "alternative plan." 173
The alternative plan was to relocate a portion of the Dubuque operations to a
facility purchased in Rochelle, illinois. 174 In light of the company's latest
"surprise," the union reconsidered accepting the company's wage freeze
proposal, but again rejected the desired concessions. 175 The company then
stated that its plans to discontinue the hog kill and cut operations were final and
that the company's action was "motivated solely by economic factors." 176
Despite this statement, the company continued to seek wage reductions to no
avail. In October 1980, the hog kill and cut operations began at the Rochelle
plant and ceased at the Dubuque plant. Despite the relocation and hopes of
improved prosperity, Dubuque Packing Company was forced to close and sell
both its Rochelle and Dubuque facilities in October 1982 because of a failure to
obtain necessary financing. 177
agreement. The company proposed that the freeze go into effect on July 1. In addition to its
other promises, the company stated that management wages would be frozen as well.
Dubuque 1, 287 N.L.R.B. at 508, 510.
173 United Food & Commercial Workers'Int'l Union, Local 150-A, 880 F.2d at 1426.
The union was completely unaware of any "alternative plan" and its respective
consequences. Id.
174 Id. The effect of the relocation would be the elimination of 1,400 jobs as opposed
to the original estimation of 500. Id.; see supra note 165. Furthermore, the company had
options to lease two slaughterhouses, one in DuQuion, Illinois and the other in Des Moines,
Iowa. These options, however, were permitted to expire because of the purchase of facilities
in Rochelle, Illinois. The facilities at Rochelle were supposedly better designed and more
efficient. Dubuque 1, 287 N.L.R.B. at 511, 529.
175 United Food & Commercial Workers' Int'l Union, Local 150-A, 880 F.2d at 1427.
Also during June and July, a major dispute developed as the union wanted access to the
corporate books of each facility in order to determine the actual nature of the losses the
company reported as well as the feasibility of the offered profit-sharing plan. After a
prolonged dispute, the company permitted an auditor of the union's choice to review
material and make a report. This report, however, was subject to further review and
amendment by Price Waterhouse, an international accounting firm. The union later argued
that the company's failure to produce the "books" upon request was a breach of the
company's duty to provide the books and bargain in good faith. Dubuque I, 287 N.L.R.B.
at 510-29.
176 Dubuque 1, 287 N.L.R.B. at 515.
177 Id. at 529.
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B. Procedural History
The union filed charges against Dubuque Packing alleging unfair labor
practices. 178 The A'J.s opinion relied wholly on the Otis II plurality and held
that the company's decision to relocate its hog kill and cut operations to
Rochelle did not turn upon labor costs and, therefore, was not subject to
mandatory bargaining. Although admitting that labor costs were a factor, the
ALJ stated that the company's decision turned upon "the long-term
improbability of continuing work in Dubuque." 179 According to the AJ, the
essence of the company's decision had to be evaluated against the backdrop of
the serious financial difficulties facing the company. 180
Although modifications were sought and made while the agreement was in
effect, the ALJ held that Milwaukee Spring II did not apply because the
agreement provided that the company could transfer jobs as necessary.' 8'
Thus, because there was no work preservation clause, the company met its
obligation by bargaining in good faith to an impasse over its decision.1 82
The AJ went on to hold that the company's surprise alternative plan only
resulted in misinformation to the union. 183 However, because the employer did
not have to bargain with the union concerning a decision to relocate or to
partially close its operations, the misinformation did not result in an unfair
labor practice.' 84 Furthermore, because the company was under no duty to
bargain concerning the relocation decision, the promise made by the company
that it would not seek additional concessions from the union for the term of the
agreement was irrelevant. The AJ refused to penalize the company for
seeking concessions if it did not even have to bargain with the union over the
decision to relocate.' 85 Finally, because the company had no duty to bargain
178 United Food & Connercial Workers' Int'l Union, Local 150-A, 880 F.2d at 1427.
The union filed two separate charges, one on June 26 and the other on August 7, 1981.
They were consolidated in the hearings before the AU. Id.
179 Dubuque 1, 287 N.L.R.B. at 537.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 535. The agreement provided in relevant part:
21.1 The Company has the right to discontinue, combine, transfer, or split a job or jobs
as the necessities of the business may require. Before taking such action, the Company
shall give the Union in writing the changes desired together with the results to be
obtained in making the proposed change ....
Id.
182 Id. at 536. See supra part V.C.
183 Id. at 538-39.
184 Id. at538 n.124.
185 Id. at 539.
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and its decision to relocate was motivated by economic considerations, not anti-
union animus, the AU found no violation of the Act.186
The Board summarily adopted the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the
AU.1 7 Two members of the Board, however, added that under any of the
views of Otis 11, the company would not have been obligated to bargain with
the union over its relocation decision.188 In a somewhat condescending
opinion, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded the case,
scolding the ALJ and the Board for the lack of reasoning in Dubuque I as well
as the lack of consistency and failure to live up to their responsibility in
addressing employer relocation decisions. 18 9
The court first concluded that in light of First National Maintenance, Otis
II was a reasonable approach to employer relocation decisions. 190 The court
noted that despite its shortcomings, Otis II provided simplicity and
predictability.191
The court then stated that the AUJ opinion lacked the reasoning necessary
for an appellate review because of its failure to demonstrate the factors relied
upon in concluding that the company's decision did not turn upon labor
costs. 192 The court then suggested that two basic ingredients required
examination when deciding if a relocation decision was subject to collective
bargaining. First, the relevant factors must have pre-dated or have been
contemporaneous with the decision itself. Second, the judicial or administrative
review must involve a review of what was "actually in the minds of those
making the decision." 193 The court concluded that the AJ's opinion was
merely an exercise in justifying the employer's decision. 194
The court then turned its attack to the summary affirmance of the AL's
opinion by the Board. The court cited three items neglected by the Board in its
review of the case. First, the court criticized the Board for its "under any of the
views expressed in Otis I" approach.' 9 5 The court stated that while there were
186 Id. at 541.
187 Id. at 499. The Board adopted the AL's conclusion and order in a twenty-line
written opinion.
188 Id. at499 n.1.
189 United Food & Commercial Workers' Int'l Union, Local 150-A v. NLRB, 880
F.2d 1422, 1423, 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
190 Id. at 1432-34. In fact, the court held that in light of First National Maintenance, it
was difficult to argue that relocation decisions created a duty to bargain in good faith. Id. at
1433. Furthermore, according to the court, it was difficult to maintain that the Board was
required by First National Maintenance to come up with an approach that would require
bargaining anytime labor costs were a factor. Id.
191 Id. at 1434.
192 Id. at 1434-35.
193 Id. at 1434.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 1436.
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similarities between the three different approaches, there were also fundamental
differences-differences that made it preposterous for the Board to state that
any Otis 11 approach would apply to Dubuque Packing's decision to relocate. 196
The court urged the Board to accept responsibility for "clarifying and
identifying the standards guiding its decisions" and to attempt to formulate a
majority-supported opinion. 197
Second, the court criticized the Board's failure to reconcile Dubuque I with
prior decisions. 198 The Board's failure to indicate distinctions between the
cases troubled the court. 199
Finally, the court noted that the Board had failed to address the argument
that even though the employer was under no duty to bargain over its mid-term
decision to relocate, the employer's duty to bargain did arise when it sought
concessions involving wages and benefits. 200 Thus, despite the fact that the
employer may not have been under a duty to bargain over its decision to
relocate, the Board needed to elaborate on why the company was not under a
duty to bargain over the mandatory subjects brought to the bargaining table.201
C. Dubuque Packing II
On remand, the Board acknowledged its responsibility, and in response to
the court's urging, developed a "new test" for determining whether an
employer's decision to relocate should be subject to mandatory collective
bargaining. 202
In the first step of its analysis, the Board compared Fibreboard and First
National Maintenance and developed three considerations for determining if a
196 Id. at 1436-37. The court pointed out that under Zimmerman's approach,
bargaining may be required even if the decision did not turn upon labor costs, so long as
labor concessions might be made. Id. at 1436 (emphasis added).. The court did not
understand how, in light of the company's continued seeking of union concessions, the
Board could hold that under the Zimmerman approach the decision was not amenable to
resolution through the collective bargaining process. Id. at 1437. Furthermore, the court
expressed doubts as to how both the plurality and Dennis' two-step approach could be met
due to the apparent amenability of the decision in light of the facts of the case. Id.
197 Id. at 1436-37. The court declared that the Board had crossed the line between
"tolerably terse" and "intolerably mute" by expressing such an opinion without elaboration.
Id. at 1437 (relying on Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971)).
198 Id. at 1437.
199 Id. Specifically, the court cited Plymouth Stamping Div., 286 N.L.R.B. no. 85
(1987), enforced, 870 F.2d 1112 (6th Cir. 1989) as a similar case with a different
conclusion.
200 Id. at 1438.
201 Id.
202 Dubuque Packing II, 303 N.L.R.B. no. 66, 1991 WL 146795, at *4 (1991).
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relocation decision more closely resembled subcontracting-in which case it
would be subject to mandatory collective bargaining under Fibreboard, or
partial closings-in which case it would not be subject to mandatory collective
bargaining under First National Maintenance.203 First, the Board looked at
whether the decision resulted in the replacement of employees. 204 The Board
found that relocations resulted in the replacement of one group of employees
with another group of employees performing the exact same work at different
facilities.20 5 Thus, because different workers were performing the same tasks,
relocations resembled subcontracting. Second, the Board considered whether
relocation decisions altered the scope and direction of the business
operations.206 The Board decided that a relocation decision "presupposes that
the employer intends to continue in business with the unanswered question
being where the business entity will be in operation." 20 7 A decision to conduct
business at one location rather than another, "standing alone, does not
generally involve a 'managerial decision... concerning the basic scope of the
enterprise .... "'208 Therefore, the Board stated that relocation decisions did
not alter the business' direction. Finally, the Board examined the type of cost
considerations in the two Supreme Court cases. 209 The Board explained that
because relocation decisions involved the replacement of employees, it logically
followed that the labor cost for one group of employees versus another group
was an important consideration.210 In view of these three considerations, the
Board decided that relocation decisions more closely resembled Fibreboard
and, therefore, were particularly susceptible to resolution via collective
bargaining. 211
In view of the Board's conclusion that relocation decisions were amenable
to the collective bargaining process, the Board then developed its "new test."
Under the new test, the initial burden for showing that the relocation decision
is subject to mandatory collective bargaining rests upon the General Counsel,
who must demonstrate that the relocation will not result in a basic change in the
business' operations. Upon demonstrating this, the General Counsel establishes
a prima facie case that the employer's decision to relocate is subject to





208 Id. The Board stated that. "without more," the mere decision to relocate did not
alter a company's basic operation because the company was still producing the "same
product for the same customers under essentially the same working conditions." Id.
2 09 Id. The Board indicated that the First National Maintenance decision turned upon a
management fee while the Fibreboard decision turned upon a desire to reduce labor costs.
210 Id. at *8-9 & n.12.
211 Id. at *9.
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mandatory collective bargaining. 212 The burden then shifts to the employer,
who may rebut the prima facie ... case or prove one ... of two things. First,
the employer may show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that labor costs
were not a factor (direct or indirect) in the decision to relocate. Second, the
employer may show that even if labor costs were a factor in the decision to
relocate, the union could not have offered concessions that would have altered
the employer's decision.213
The Board proceeded to apply its new test. The Board indicated that there
was no evidence whatsoever that the company's relocation would result in a
change of operations. 214 Therefore, the burden shifted to the company to prove
one of the two prongs of the test. Relying on the AUJ opinion, the Board found
that labor costs clearly were a factor in the company's decision to relocate to
Rochelle.215 Thus, the first prong was unavailable to the company. As for the
second prong, the Board stated it, too, was exempt from the company's use.
After reviewing the facts of the case at length, the Board stated that despite the
numerous financial problems the company faced, the fact that the company
continually sought concessions from the union regarding labor costs established
that bargaining would be productive. 216 Thus, the Board concluded that
2 12 Id.
213 Id. As an example of the second prong, the Board stated that if an employer could
show that the costs of modernization exceeded any concessions the union might be able to
offer, then the employer would not have a duty to bargain with the union over its decision
to relocate. The Board also noted that an employer would enhance its chances of success
under this prong of the test if the employer described to the union its reasons for relocating,
fully explained the costs and benefits of the relocation, and asked the union if it could offer
labor cost concessions that would enable the employer to meet its objectives without
relocating. Id.
214 Id. at *10.
215 Id. at *10_11 (emphasis added) (quoting Dubuque I, 287 N.L.R.B. 499, 537
(1987)).
216 Id. at *11-16. The facts of the case indicated that if the labor cost concessions (i.e.,
the wage freeze) could be gained, the Dubuque plant would remain open. The hope was
that these concessions would draw a favorable response from the banks and, therefore,
improve the flow of credit. Even after the union rejected the wage freeze, the company
continued to seek concessions, stating that if the concessions were obtained, the Dubuque
facilities could be saved. Id. at *12-13. Thus, because the company so diligently sought the
concessions, it was unable to argue that financial difficulties would have forced relocation
even with union concessions. The company also attempted to argue that the Rochelle plant
offered much more modern and efficient facilities than did the Dubuque plant and that
relocation was a necessity in light of the company's failure to obtain the financing necessary
to modernize the Dubuque facilities. Id. at *14. The Board disregarded the company's
arguments because the record was devoid of any description of the Rochelle facilities.
Furthermore, there was nothing to indicate the superior technology of either the Rochelle
facilities or the two facilities on which the options were permitted to expire because the
company apparently never sent anyone to inspect any of the considered facilities. Id. at *15.
[Vol. 53:909
1991] EMPLOYER RELOCATION & COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 941
because the company persistently sought concessions, the union could have
offered concessions that would alter the employer's decision.2 17 After applying
the new test to the facts of the case, the Board reversed its earlier decision and
held that the company failed to bargain in good faith with the union as required
by the Act.218
VI. ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTED APPROACH
A. Analysis of Dubuque II
Dubuque H represents a step backward rather than a step forward in
resolving the problem of whether an employer's decision to relocate should be
subject to mandatory collective bargaining. Although urged by the court of
appeals to formulate a consistent majority-supported opinion concerning
decisions to relocate,219 the Board formulated an approach not only inconsistent
with First National Maintenance but also inconsistent with the purposes of the
Act.
The Board's initial reasoning is fundamentally flawed. In creating the three
distinctions between Fibreboard and First National Maintenance, the Board
appears to be operating on the assumption that First National Maintenance
mandates a per se rule that all partial closures are not mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining while all decisions to contract out labor are.220 Relying on
such a premise is wrong, despite commentary suggesting the contrary. 221
In First National Maintenance, the Court specifically limited the holding to
the facts of the case. 222 The Court never suggested that all partial-closing
decisions would necessarily reach the same result. If it were a per se rule, there
was really no need for the balancing test; the Court could have simply held that
decisions to partially close operations do not fall within "terms and conditions
of employment." Furthermore, to suggest that all decisions to subcontract are
subject to mandatory collective bargaining is inconsistent with the limited
holding of Fibreboard as well as subsequent case law. For instance, in NLRB v.
The Board went on to summarily dismiss the company's defenses of contractual waiver and
the union's failure to timely request bargaining. id. at *16-18.
217 Id. at *16.
218 Id. at *18-19. The company violated, inter alia, sections 8(a)(5) and (1). Because
the Board found that the company did have a duty to bargain with the union, the Board did
not have to address the issue created by the company seeking midterm modifications of
wages. See United Food & Commercial Workers' Int'l Union, Local 150-A v. NLRB, 880
F.2d 1422, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
219 See supra notes 187-201 and accompanying text.
220 See Dubuque I1, 303 N.L.R.B. no. 66, 1991 WL 146795, at *8.
221 See generally sources cited supra note 88.
222 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 687 (1981).
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Adams Dairy, the Eighth Circuit held, in light of Fibreboard, that a decision to
subcontract labor, motivated by economic considerations, did not require
collective bargaining with the union.223
The essence of the approach formulated by the Board merely results in a
return to the "rebuttable presumption" approach specifically criticized and
rejected in First National Maintenance.224 Under Dubuque /, while the union
has an initial threshold requirement to show that no substantial change in the
nature of the employer's operations has occured, the burden is upon the
employer to rebut the presumption that its decision turned upon labor costs, or
even if the decision did turn upon labor costs, that the union could not have
offered concessions to get the employer to change its decision to relocate.225
The Supreme Court rejected the rebuttable presumption test due to its
inherent shortcomings. Primarily, the Court stressed that the rebuttable
presumption test resulted in a lack of predictability for employers. 226 The
employers would be uncertain as to whether they could rebut the presumption
that they must bargain. 227 This uncertainty is due to the variety of different
factors the reviewing body may consider and the different weights it could
place on them.228 Thus, an employer would encounter great difficulty in
determining when and to what extent it must bargain over its decision, and
would feel obligated to bargain over all decisions regardless of amenability to
the collective bargaining process. 229
It is clear from the Court's discussion in First National Maintenance that it
disdained the rebuttable presumption approach to mandatory collective
bargaining. 23 0 The Court stated that the presumption analysis seems "ill-suited
223 NLRB v. Adams Dairy, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1011 (1966). The court went to great lengths to demonstrate the differences between this
case and Fibreboard. Adams Dairy involved terminating its driver/salesman line and
replacing it with independent contractors. The court held that the result of the decision was
a change in the basic operation of the business. Id.
224 See supra notes 84-104 and accompanying text. The Board has recently referred to
its Dubuque HI decision as a "presumption rebutting analysis." Noblit Bros., Inc. v.
Teamsters Union, Local 115, 305 N.L.R.B. no. 37, 1991 WL 208820, at *2 n.9 (1991);
see also McArthur, supra note 62, at 290-91.
225 See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
226 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 684-85.
227 Id. See also Heinsz, supra note 41, at 93-94, 108 (1981); Terri Ann-Weston
Willits, Recent Development, Labor Law-First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB-
Employer's Duty to Bargain Over Partial losures, 7 J. CORP. L. 381, 388-89 (1981).
228 See, e.g., ABC Trans-Nat'l Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 642 F.2d 675 (3d Cir.
1981); Equitable Gas Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1981); NLRB v. First Nat'l
Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596, 599-601 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 666 (1981);
Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978).22 9 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 685.
230 See supra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
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to advance harmonious relations between employer and employee."2 1 Such
sweeping language seems to apply to all areas of decision bargaining. It is
unlikely that a presumption analysis would be "ill-suited to advance
harmonious relations between employer and employee" in partial-closure
decisions, but not in relocations. In light of such explicit language by the
Court, it is difficult to ascertain why the Board digressed from its trend toward
balancing and chose to use a presumption analysis.
The rebuttable presumption approach is also inconsistent with the Act.23 2
The presumption test used in Dubuque H is not only unfair to management, but
it also potentially harms labor. The purpose of the Act is to promote the free
flow of commerce and industrial peace by equalizing the bargaining power
between labor and management.23 3 Congress designed the Act to place labor on
equal ground with management by building bargaining requirements into the
labor-management relationship. Arguably, such presumptions are justified
because the employer clearly has greater access to information and is clearly
more aware of why it is choosing to relocate than the union. Nevertheless, the
Act itself placed the parties on equal ground so that they could negotiate fairly.
By creating presumptions against the employer, the Board is merely reversing
the inequality that once existed between labor and management, putting
management at a disadvantage because of the uncertainty and additional
burdens created by the rebuttable presumption approach. The result of the
created "presumptions" is to require employers to bargain with the unions over
decisions whose outcomes the union can in no way change. Although the Act
equalized the playing field, there are still some decisions that are, by their
nature, only within the discretion of management. The presumption analysis
merely creates additional hurdles management must clear before it can make a
decision concerning the strategic future of the business operations. Such an
approach hardly promotes peace and cooperation, nor does it equalize the
relationship of the parties. Rather, it simply wastes the time and resources of all
parties involved.
The Dubuque II approach may also adversely affect labor. In Dubuque II,
the Board cited the company's continual seeking of concessions as the primary
evidence that the union could have offered concessions and thereby influenced
the employer's decision, thus defeating the second prong of the "rebuttable
presumption." 23 4 While such reasoning appears valid, it defeats itself and the
Act. By stating that seeking concessions was the primary evidence of the
union's ability to change the employer's decision, the signal sent to employers
is clearly to avoid seeking concessions in the first place. Absent direct evidence
231 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 684.
232 See supra part II for a complete discussion of the Act and its legislative history.
233 See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
234 Dubuque Packing II, 303 N.L.R.B. no. 66, 1991 WL 146795, at *11-16 (1991).
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that the union may be able to make concessions, the employer can more easily
rebut the presumption of its duty to bargain. Clearly, the "new test" runs amok
with the Act and results in unfairness to both management and labor.
Unlike the approaches set forth in Otis i, the new test is not defensible.23 5
It has no basis in the Act or in Supreme Court precedent. Because of the above
insufficiencies, whether the Board appropriately applied its new test makes little
difference.
B. The Approach of First National Maintenance
Many have been quick to criticize First National Maintenance, but slow to
provide any further guidance.23 6 This Comment suggests that the balancing test
set forth in First National Maintenance is the approach that should apply to
relocation decisions.
The Court in First National Maintenance explicitly stated that its decision
concerning the partial closure did not express any view on relocation
decisions. 3 7 Just because the Court left the relocation decisions open,
however, did not necessarily mean to imply that the Board should no longer
apply the balancing test to relocation decisions. It has been strongly suggested
that while the Court did not require that its balancing test be used in other types
of management decisions, the nature of First National Maintenance mandated
some type of benefit/burden analysis. 238 In upholding the reasonableness of the
Otis II approaches, the courts found that First National Maintenance left the
area of relocation decisions open. Because of this, the courts could not say
labor costs or amenability were not such important factors that an opinion
dealing with an employer's decision to relocate could not turn upon these
factors. 23 9 Thus, while the Court intimated no view as to other types of
management decisions, First National Maintenance pushed the Board toward
some type of balancing approach. Although the Otis II standards were
divergent, they each involved a balancing of the factors, however subtle, in
management's decision.240 The result in Dubuque II is a complete departure
from this direction.
Commentators consistently criticize the Court's approach in First National
Maintenance for over-emphasizing management's interest while convienently
235 See United Food & Commercial Workers' Int'l Union, Local 150-A v. NLRB, 880
F.2d 1422, 1432-34 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
236 See supra note 88; see also Local 2179, United Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB,
822 F.2d 559, 575 n.22 (5th Cir. 1987).
23 7 See supra note 102.
238 Local 2179, United Steelworkers of Am., 822 F.2d at 575 n.23.
239 See United Food & Commercial Workers' Int'l Union, Local 150-A, 880 F.2d at
1433-34; Local 2179, United Steelworkers of Am., 822 F.2d at 578-80.
2 40 See supra notes 124-37 and accompanying text.
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under-emphasizing labor's interest.241 However, this criticism is unfounded. In
First National Maintenance, when balancing the benefit of the collective
bargaining process and labor-managment relations against-the burden placed on
the employer's conduct of the business, the Court considered the union's need
to provide job security and fair dealing on behalf of its workers and the
management's need for speed, flexibility, secrecy, profitability and
confidentiality. 242 The Court indicated that the union's needs were adequately
protected by the Act because Congress designed the Act to balance the scales
that long favored management. 243 Thus, when applying the balancing test, the
extent of protection received by the union via federal legislation must be
considered as a factor weighing in favor of the employee interests.244
When applied properly, the language of the balancing test offers a novel
approach to resolving disputes over which decisions are subject to mandatory
collective bargaining. The test is not only consistent with the Act, but it also
provides flexibility in the dynamic, ever-changing environment of labor
relations.
The history of the Act specifically indicates that no set formula was to
provide the answer for what is and is not subject to mandatory collective
bargaining. Rather, what is subject to decision bargaining must depend upon
the industry, the current economic and political climate, the needs of the
bargaining parties, and any other relevant factors.245 The balancing test is
flexible enough to accomodate these requirements, as opposed to a rebuttable
presumption test or any other test that results in a "set formula." The key is to
make sure that the factors of the balancing test are each properly examined in
light of the surrounding circumstances. Therefore, when properly applied in a
"comprehensive" manner, the balancing test is perhaps the only truly adequate
means for determining whether a decision to relocate is subject to mandatory
collective bargaining. The bottom line is that the balancing approach is more
consistent with the Act and should be adopted rather than the rebuttable
presumption approach. Although ultimately some decisions will never reach the
table, the Act was never meant to deprive management of such decisions that
are peculiarly within its sphere and beyond the union's. Rather, the Act was
241 See supra note 88.
2 42 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681-82 (1981).
243 See id. at 677-83.
2 44 See generally Joseph R. Knight, Note, Dedsion-Bargaining and the NLRA-A Plea
for the Resurrection of First National Maintenance Corp., 68 TEX. L. REV. 625, 640-42
(1990) (Knight suggests that the balancing test was applied constitutionally in light of NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), because the Act equalized the scales
between labor and management. If the Court only engaged in simple balancing, it would
have been unconstitutional due to infringement upon the Commerce Clause and
management's decisionmaking power.).
245 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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meant to bring the employer and the union together to bargain over those items
amenable to the collective bargaining process.
Admittedly, however, just as the presumption approach failed to provide
certainty for management in determining whether it is required to bargain over
its decision to relocate, the balancing test encounters similar difficulty in this
capacity. In a field of law governed by dynamic change, economic forces, and
contractual relationships, it is difficult to develop an approach that will
consistently yield a definite outcome. Yet, at least under the balancing test, the
employer can look at the totality of the circumstances, know the factors and the
weights assigned to them, and then fairly and accurately determine whether it
must bargain with the union over a decision to relocate. There will be no
senseless preliminary hurdles to overcome. Also, as the test is applied to
various situations by the Board and the courts, with the factors of their
decisions articulately delineated, patterns will eventually develop as to the facts
and circumstances surrounding those types of cases which require mandatory
collective bargaining.
It is imperative, however, that a per se approach never evolve. Such a
result is inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. What is subject to collective
bargaining depends, at any given time, upon the industry, political, and social
trends, as well as upon employer/employee needs and numerous other
considerations. 246 While it provides certainty, a per se approach is inherently
unfair to the parties because it fails to consider their respective needs and the
current environment of a unique situation at any given time. The industry and
the labor market are dynamic and complex environments. A single unbending,
inflexible rule cutting across all situations, without considering the specifics of
a particular situation, only performs a disservice to the goals of collective
bargaining.
C. Suggested Approach
The Board and the courts should use the First National Maintenance
balancing test to determine whether a decision by an employer to relocate is
subject to mandatory collective bargaining. In examining the benefits of the
collective bargaining process and labor-management relations, two overlapping
factors must be considered. These two overlapping factors are (1) the nature of
the relationship between labor and management; and (2) the nature of
management's decision. Both of the factors must be viewed in light of the facts
of the particular case. The goal in examining the two factors is to determine if
the decision is amenable to collective bargaining. Unlike Member Dennis'
approach, determining amenability is a goal of the balancing test.247 It seems
246 Id.
247 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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absurd to use amenability as a threshold requirement when the determination of
amenability, in and of itself, requires a balancing of the different factors-
without acknowledging exactly what the factors are.248 By not expounding the
factors relied upon in the initial determination of amenability, Dennis' two-step
approach merely results in a pre-determined outcome.
First, examining the nature of the relationship will depend greatly upon
whether the union is able to offer concessions or alternative ideas to the
employer's intended relocation. 249 This, in turn, requires looking at the totality
of the surrounding circumstances, the industry practices, and the past
bargaining relationship between the employer and the union.
Second, in examining the nature of the decision, the plurality opinion in
Otis II is applicable.250 Whether the decision turns upon labor costs or a
change in the nature, scope, or direction of the business will have a significant
impact on whether such a decision should be bargained over or unilaterally
made. Also, the extent of competing economic considerations must be
examined. Unlike the Otis II "turns on labor costs" analysis, the labor costs
must be viewed relative to the change in the nature of the business rather than
requiring mandatory bargaining only when the decision turns "solely" upon
labor costs.25 1 Thus, labor costs are "a" factor, not "the" factor. Other factors,
including the employees' interests in job security and fair dealing, must be
placed upon the scales. Under the proposed balancing test, the key is to always
consider all of the relevant factors consistently.
After considering the benefits of requiring bargaining, the next
consideration is the burden of mandatory bargaining on management
decisionmaking. The burden factors have been well delineated throughout the
various administrative and judicial decisions. The burden factors examined
include the need for speed, the need for flexibility, the need for secrecy, the
importance of profitability, the extent of capital commitment, the extent of
changes in operations, 252 and consumer/customer considerations. 253 However,
248 First National Maintenance indicated that the initial step was to determine the type
of management decision, then to apply the balancing test to determine the amenability of the
decision to the collective bargaining process. Amenability was the goal of the test, not a
preliminary hurdle. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
249 The possibility that while the union may not be able to offer concessions, but may
perhaps be able to offer alternatives or different perspectives not previously considered by
the employer for whatever reasons appears consistent with the "communication benefit"
propounded by George, supra note 10, at 699-703. However, George's approach differs in
that he supported Member Dennis' two-step approach. Id.
250 See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
251 See id.
252 Otis JI, 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 897 (1984) (Member Dennis, concurring) (citing First
Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 680, 682-83, 688 (1981)).
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the need for speed, secrecy and flexibility will not be as prevalant in relocation
decisions as in partial-closure decisions, because relocation decisions typically
require substantial planning and advance study.254
Requiring an employer to bargain with the union over a decision to
relocate will depend upon the facts of the particular case, rather than a set
formula. This is not a two-prong, or two-part test. Rather, the proposed
approach is simply a "comprehensive" balancing test as set forth in First
National Maintenance. Everything must be placed upon the balancing scales
and examined from that perspective. This test is consistent with the Act, and
when applied in a principled and consistent manner it promotes fairness, and
eventually certainty and predictability-to the extent possible in this area of
law.
D. Application of the Comprehensive Balancing Test to Dubuque II
As an example of how this "comprehensive" balancing test would work,
this section applies the above-outlined approach to Dubuque II. First, in
examining the nature of the relationship, the past relations between the parties
must be considered. According to the facts, the parties had several successive
agreements governing their relationship. 25 5 Furthermore, it is evident from the
acceptance of the "buy-back" and the continual negotiations between the parties
resulting in amendments to the Agreement, it is evident that the union and the
company were willing to work together and that the union was at least
somewhat cooperative with the company in attempting to help the company
overcome its financial problems. 25 6 Overall, the nature of the parties'
relationship suggests that the decision may have been amenable to resolution
through collective bargaining. There is no evidence, however, concerning
industry practices with regard to relocation decisions.
Second, the nature of the decision must be examined. As Dubuque U
correctly indicated, labor costs were a crucial factor in the company's decision
to relocate the hog kill and cut operations. 25 7 The company continually
indicated in press releases, announcements to employees, and statements made
while negotiating that labor costs were crucial. 258 The company believed that
253 Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 720, enforced, 602 F.2d 1302
(9th Cir. 1979).
254 George, supra note 10, at 710, 712-15.
255 Dubuque I, 287 N.L.R.B. 499, 500 (1987).
256 Id. at 501-34.
257 Dubuque If, 303 N.L.R.B. no. 66, 1991 WL 146795, at *10 (1991) (quoting
Dubuque L 287 N.L.R.B. at 537).
258 See supra note 256 and accompanying text. The company continually stated that if
the union would agree to wage concessions, the hog kill and cut operations could be saved.
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reducing labor costs would enable the company to obtain the necessary
financing required to maintain operations at the Dubuque facility. Thus,
because labor costs were a significant factor in the company's decision, the
company had increased incentive to bargain with the union over its decision to
relocate. It is also clear from the facts that the nature or scope of Dubuque
Packing's business was not going to change.
As for other economic considerations, the company cited that the Dubuque
facilities were inadequate compared to the Rochelle facilities. 25 9 It is unclear
how much research actually went into the choosing of an alternative plant and
to what extent the Rochelle facilities offered improvement over Dubuque. The
company also argued that it suffered immensely as a result of the difficulties it
had with the banks and obtaining necessary credit.260 The financial difficulties
Dubuque Packing suffered cannot be minimized. 261 Nevertheless, it is evident
from the facts that the company believed that most of its financial difficulties
were the result of high labor costs. 262 Thus, it appears that labor costs were a
relatively significant consideration compared to the other economic
considerations.
Also, the union had a legitimate argument that the company violated its
obligation of fair dealing by setting deadlines and breaching its promise not to
seek additional concessions, especially while the relationship was governed by
the agreement. 263 Finally, the union had a significant interest in job security
because an entire operation of the Dubuque plant would be discontinued, and a
significant number of jobs would be lost. Because of the lack of fair dealing,
there would thus be a possible violation of the Act. Hence, the benefits of
requiring bargaining are fairly substantial.
As for the burdens, in light of the continuing press releases and repeated
attempts to obtain financing as well as attempts to get the union to make
concessions for over a year, speed, secrecy, and flexibility could not be issues.
Also, the company was not relocating in order to continue serving a particular
customer. The only substantial burden upon the company was the dire
economic situation it faced for approximately five years before relocating.
Again, these difficulties appear to have been primarily the result of high labor
costs. Thus, when the burdens are weighed against the benefits, it would
appear that the company should have been required to bargain with the union
regarding its decision to relocate to Rochelle.
Such blatant statements, especially in press releases, are evidence that labor costs were the
crucial, if not the motivating factor.
259 Dubuque II, 303 N.L.R.B. no. 66, 1991 WL 146795, at *14.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
263 United Food & Commercial Workers' Int'l Union, Local 150-A v. NLRB, 880
F.2d 1422, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
As noted previously, the result of the application of this balancing test does
not produce a per se result for all relocation decisions. Rather, the decision
rests on the unique facts and circumstances of the case.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" has produced a
vast amount of diverse literature and case law, the approach for resolving these
difficulties has been adequately set forth in First National Maintenance.
Applying the First National Maintenance balancing test in a comprehensive
manner involves consistently weighing the benefits of collective bargaining
against the burdens that collective bargaining imposes upon management's
decisionmaking. Two overlapping factors require review when examining the
benefits of collective bargaining: the nature of the relationship between labor
and management and the nature of management's decision. After scrutinizing
the benefits, the burden that collective bargaining imposes upon management's
decisionmaking process must be examined. The benefits and the burdens must
then be weighed against one another in light of the specific facts and
circumstances surrounding the labor-management relationship. If applied
consistently and comprehensively, as pointed out by this Comment, the First
National Maintenance balancing test provides the tools for resolving not only
difficult employer relocation decisions but also other Type HI management
decisions by leaving the bargaining in the hands of the parties as much as
possible.
Todd L. Sarver
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